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Abstract 
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections took place in a very particular environment. Economic crisis, bailout pack-
ages, and austerity measures were central on the agenda in many Southern countries while open borders and intra-EU 
migration gained high salience elsewhere in the Union. A strong decline of political trust in European and national insti-
tutions was alarming. At the same time, the nomination and campaigning of “Spitzenkandidaten”, lead candidates of EP 
political groups for European Commission (EC) presidency, was meant to establish a new linkage between European 
Parliament elections and the (s)election of the president of the Commission. All of this might have changed the very na-
ture of EP elections as second-order national elections. In this paper, we try to shed light on this by analysing aggregate 
election results, both at the country-level and at the party-level and compare them with the results of the preceding 
first-order national election in each EU member country. Our results suggest that the ongoing politicisation of EU poli-
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1. Introduction: Same Question, Different Europe 
Since the very first direct election of the members of 
the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, the question has 
been on the table various times: are European Parlia-
ment elections still second-order national elections? Is 
it still mainly national political dynamics that are affect-
ing the voting behaviour of European citizens when 
they cast their votes in European Parliament elections, 
or do we find significant traces of EU policy voting? 
This paper seeks to answer this question for the Euro-
pean Parliament elections of late May 2014. 
The European Union of 2014 and the direct elec-
tions of its parliament in this year differ from the past 
in a number of ways. First of all, since the first direct 
elections, the number of member countries has more 
than tripled and increased from 9 to 28. Today, the Un-
ion includes both the West and the East of the conti-
nent, with a lot of variation in electoral and party sys-
tems. Secondly, the power of the European Parliament 
has increased continuously, especially since the Lisbon 
Treaty. Based on Lisbon stipulations, and for the first 
time in the history of European Parliament elections, 
five political groups of the EP offered voters a say re-
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 167-181 168 
garding the presidency of the EC by nominating their 
lead-candidates for the position ahead of the election. 
Thirdly, and perhaps not least importantly, the policy 
reach of the Union has increased continuously, and 
steeply, from the 1950s onwards (Wallace & Wallace, 
2007). This can be demonstrated by the number of EU-
initiated legislative acts that arrive in national parlia-
ments for ratification. Since this number is roughly 
(though not exactly, as not every country is part of eve-
ry treaty) the same for all EU member countries, it may 
suffice to study its evolution over the years in Germany 
(Figure 1). It becomes very clear here that the EU has 
become an ever more important legislator in all of its 
member-countries, and in quite a wide range of policy 
domains (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Schmitt, 2005). 
This is the quantitative aspect of the history of the 
legislative activity of the European Union. For a more 
qualitative perspective, it might be useful to concen-
trate on two major EU political projects: the single Eu-
ropean market and, in particular, the open borders pol-
icy, and the single European currency and the 
complementary common monetary policy. Both of 
these policies are said to have had positive conse-
quences regarding the stimulation of economic growth 
(European Commission, 2015). However, according to 
the neo-neo-functionalist theory of European integra-
tion (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009; Schmitter, 2005), 
they are at the same time likely to have caused unin-
tended political side effects of a more critical nature. 
With regard to the four freedoms of the single Europe-
an market—open borders for goods, persons, services 
and capital—the free movement of persons is said to 
have posed challenges to national identity (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2009) and social security (Kriesi, 2009; Kriesi et 
al., 2006). On the side of the economic and public debt 
crisis, and the monetary policies of the Eurozone that 
were agreed to counter it, it seems that austerity poli-
cies imposed by the EU on debtor countries have had 
electoral consequences, diminishing electoral support 
for government parties (Magalhães, 2014) and favour-
ing Eurosceptical parties (Kriesi, 2014). For obvious 
reasons, this has been more profound in Southern Eu-
rope (Bosco & Verney, 2012; Freire, Teperoglou, & 
Moury, 2014; Verney & Bosco, 2013) than elsewhere, 
but there are also Western European (Alternative für 
Deutschland) and Northern European (True Finns) ex-
amples pointing in that direction. 
In this paper, we set out to assess the effects of 
these EU policies on the results of the European Par-
liament elections of May 2014. We will do so by com-
paring EU-policy effects on the support base of political 
parties with the more conventional second-order elec-
tions (SOE) baseline model. We proceed as follows: we 
first recapitulate the theoretical background of second-
order elections and present the basic hypotheses that 
are customarily derived from it. We confront these 
with a set of alternative hypotheses focussing on the 
potential electoral consequences of EU policy making. 
Following this, we proceed to briefly present our data-
base, and to test our hypotheses. The last section of-
fers an intermediate conclusion and discusses ques-
tions for future research. 
 
Figure 1. The increase of EU-initiated legislative acts ar-
riving at the German Federal Parliament. Source: Deut-
scher Bundestag, 2014; Feldkamp, 2010, 2014. 
2. Still Second-Order? 
In the aftermath of the first direct election of the 
members of the European Parliament in June 1979, the 
concept of second-order national elections was pro-
posed in order to understand the outcome of these 
novel kinds of supranational but still “less important” 
elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Back then, multi-level 
governance was novel territory in Europe (arguably 
with the exception of federal Germany, Spain with its 
autonomous regions, and the special case of Switzer-
land). The policy reach of the Union was still limited 
(see again Figure 1), and the powers of the European 
Parliament were limited too. In such an environment, 
EP elections were far from deciding who is “in power” 
in the European Union (or the European Community as 
it was called back then). National first-order elections 
determined the composition of national parliaments 
and governments, and thereby had an impact on Euro-
pean policy making by affecting the composition of the 
Council of Ministers. In European Parliament elections, 
therefore, voters did not cast their votes to choose the 
best candidates for governing the EU, but they did 
support or oppose parties and candidates primarily for 
national reasons (Kuechler, 1991). Characteristic of 
those second-order elections is that there is less-at-
stake than in really important elections. The second-
order elections model was developed for Western Eu-
rope and amended and revised by various scholars 
(Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004; Marsh, 1998; Norris & 
Reif, 1997; Reif, 1984). After the big enlargement of 
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the Union in 2004 which incorporated at once eight 
Eastern European countries plus Cyprus and Malta, 
things have become more complicated again because 
of the relative electoral instability of the new Eastern 
member countries. New research reflecting on those 
effects has been added to the literature (e.g., Hix & 
Marsh, 2011; Koepke & Ringe, 2006; Schmitt, 2005). 
In this paper we analyse the 2014 European Parlia-
ment elections in order to see whether they still fit the 
original claim. While we realise that SOE research has 
progressed over the years quite considerably—for ex-
ample with regard to the analysis of micro-foundations 
of voting behaviour in EP elections (Carrubba & 
Timpone, 2005; Hobolt & Spoon, 2012; Hobolt & 
Wittrock, 2011; Schmitt, Sanz, & Braun, 2009; Weber, 
2011)—we believe that the original predictions of the 
SOE model are still the main manifestation of it. In what 
follows, we will confront those original predictions with 
an alternative model that focuses on EU-policies. In the 
original set of hypotheses based on national politics, a 
first prediction is that fewer voters participate in these 
elections simply because there is “less-at-stake”. Sec-
ond-order elections are less politicised and electoral 
mobilisation is lower than in first-order elections. These 
reasons behind low participation rates have been inves-
tigated in a steadily growing body of research. The re-
sults of these studies depend a bit on the research de-
sign and the richness of the set of control variables 
introduced in micro-level models of electoral participa-
tion. Overall, the findings suggest that non-voting in Eu-
ropean Parliament elections is normally not caused by 
Euroscepticism and hence not a sign of a legitimacy crisis 
of the European Union (Franklin, 2001; Schmitt, 2005; 
Schmitt & Mannheimer, 1991; van der Eijk & Schmitt, 
2009) but see also Blondel, Sinnott, and Svensson (1998) 
for the opposite view. This first hypothesis thus predicts: 
H1: Participation is lower in EP elections, compared 
to the preceding national first-order election. 
The second prediction of the second-order national 
election model claims that national government parties 
do worse compared to national first-order elections 
since a number of voters will punish them for the—
unavoidable—disappointments they have caused in the 
national political arena. This kind of punishment can be 
realised as vote switching away from government par-
ties (when first-order voters support a party other than 
the previously chosen government party) or as absten-
tion (when first-order government voters abstain in EP 
elections).  
H2: Government parties’ vote shares decline in EP 
elections, compared to the previous national first-
order election. 
In addition, it has been proposed that the size of the 
government parties’ losses follows a pattern which is 
related to the national electoral cycle. Already in the 
1970, US scholars found that the popularity of the US 
president follows a cyclical pattern with a post-
electoral euphoria right after the victory, a decline in 
popularity roughly until mid-term, and a gradual recov-
ery in the approach to the subsequent on-year election 
(Campbell, 1993; Stimson, 1976; Tufte, 1975). Similar 
phenomena has been confirmed for state elections in 
Germany (Dinkel, 1978; Schmitt & Reif, 2003), less im-
portant elections in Portugal (Freire, 2004), and for by-
elections in Britain (Norris, 1990). Second-order Europe-
an Parliament election results were also found to be 
shaped by the national electoral cycle (Reif, 1984; Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980). As first-order national elections are held 
at different times relative to the date of the EP election, 
the timing of the latter within the national electoral cy-
cles differs between the EU member countries.  
H3: Government parties’ losses follow the national 
electoral cycle and are more severe towards 
midterm. 
Since second-order elections are “less-important” we 
assume that there will be less strategic voting than in 
first-order elections. Strategic voting means that citizens 
vote for a party other than their most preferred one in 
order to be able to affect the outcome of the elections 
(Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2001). In the first-
order electoral arena, strategic voting is expected to 
strengthen the support for larger parties, since they are 
more likely to govern. Supporting them reduces the 
danger of wasting one’s vote. In second-order elections, 
however, as there is less-at-stake, the consequences of 
wasting one’s vote are less severe. It is therefore ex-
pected that more citizens (in relative terms) cast their 
vote for smaller parties even if there is no realistic possi-
bility for them to gain parliamentary representation and 
affect public policy. We therefore expect: 
H4: Small parties do better in EP elections, 
compared to their results in first-order national 
elections. 
Our second set of hypotheses goes beyond the original 
SOE model and focusses on the impact of EU initiated 
policies on European Parliament election results. While 
this possibility was not ignored in the original state-
ment of the model (cf. Reif & Schmitt, 1980, p. 11), it 
was certainly less prominent than it is today. This per-
spective adds another two predictions to the original 
four as we concentrate here on two key EU policies. 
Both of them originate in the Single European Market 
project: the policy of open borders and that of a com-
mon currency and hence a common monetary policy. 
The first EU-initiated policy with alleged conse-
quences for electoral behaviour originates in one of the 
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four liberties of the Single European Market—the free 
movement of persons (European Union, 2004). As a re-
sult of the completion of the Single European Market in 
general and the Schengen agreement in particular, the 
open border policy and intra-EU migration has become 
a salient political issue long before the refugee crisis 
that dominates the news at the time of writing. Immi-
gration and national identity are particularly salient is-
sues for parties on the right and the extreme right of 
the political spectrum (Golder, 2003; Meyer & 
Rosenberger, 2015; Mudde, 1999; Yilmaz, 2012). As the 
consequences of the politics of open borders are di-
rectly attributable to EU-level policies, our fifth hy-
pothesis predicts:  
H5: Parties on the extreme right do better in 
European Parliament elections as compared to first-
order national elections the higher the share of 
immigrants is in the national population.  
The second EU initiated policy with potential conse-
quences for electoral behaviour is the common mone-
tary policy within the Eurozone, and here in particular 
the “no bail-out clause” (Art. 125 Lisbon Treaty) which 
makes it illegal for one EU member country to assume 
the debts of another. This has to be seen in conjunc-
tion with the so-called “stability and growth pact” of 
the Economic and Monetary Union of which all EU 
member-countries (members and non-members of the 
Eurozone) are part. This pact sets upper limits for gov-
ernment deficit (3% GDP) and debt (60% GDP) which 
when breached has severe consequences for the fiscal 
and budgetary autonomy of a member-country. This is 
the legal basis of the austerity policy of the Eurozone 
government which in large parts of Southern Europe 
has caused economic crises, high unemployment 
(youth unemployment in particular), social unrest and 
political protest, and electoral realignments. These 
phenomena were not restricted to bailout countries or 
countries with extraordinarily high public debt. Ahead 
of the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, in 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal—the most prominent 
debtor countries of the Eurozone—public protests 
against the austerity policy of the Eurozone govern-
ment (the “Troika” of European Commission, IMF and 
ECB) were dominating the news. On the other side of 
this new economic cleavage in Europe, in the creditor 
countries, the critique about the risks of the common 
currency has lent support to new Eurosceptical parties 
even where nothing like this was known before (as in 
Germany for example). At the same time, public sup-
port for European integration went down dramatically 
both in debtor countries suffering from economic con-
sequences of severe austerity measures and, some-
what less so, in the creditor countries (Roth, Nowak-
Lehmann D., & Otter, 2013). Given this background, we 
formulate our final hypothesis as follows:  
H6: Compared to their first-order national election 
results, Eurosceptic parties do better within the 
Eurozone than outside.  
3. Data and Methods  
We test our hypotheses on the basis of data provided 
by the European Parliament itself, on its websites re-
porting on the official results of the 2014 elections 
(European Parliament, 2014). Comparable information 
regarding the previous national election results is taken 
from the “Parties and Elections” database (Nordsieck, 
2015). This database provides information on parlia-
mentary elections in European countries since 1945. 
Immigration rates are from the Eurostat database, mi-
gration and migrant population statistics (Eurostat, 
2015). Left-right positions and anti-/pro-European in-
tegration positions are mean party locations as per-
ceived by their respective national citizenry. In the case 
of left and right, left is on the low (=zero) side of the 
scale while right is on the high (=10) side. For the Euro-
pean integration dimension, 0 indicates “integration 
has gone too far”, while 10 indicates “integration 
should be pushed further”. Data are from the 2014 Eu-
ropean Election Study (EES) surveys, first and second 
waves (Schmitt, Hobolt, & Popa, 2015). We use the ef-
fective number of electoral parties (ENEP) index to de-
termine the format of a party system in consecutive 
first-order and second-order elections (Laakso & 
Taagepera, 1979). As will be discussed in detail below, 
we use this index to test H4. The dataset of Gallagher 
provides ENEP data for national elections (Gallagher, 
2014) and the same formula has been used to calculate 
comparable data for European Parliament elections. 
National-level hypotheses are tested in a bivariate 
manner, by plotting FOE results against EP election re-
sults (e.g. for turnout, government party support, etc.) 
This step of the analysis is based on 28 cases (member 
countries). Party-level hypotheses are tested in a multi-
level model using the lme4 package of R (version 1.1-7) 
with 160 cases (parties represented in the European 
Parliament) on the first level and 28 cases (member 
countries) on the second. 
3.1. Was Participation Lower? 
One of the most fundamental assumptions of the sec-
ond-order elections model is that participation is lower 
compared to first-order elections, since politicisation 
and electoral mobilisation is deficient. In addition to 
the unfavourable comparison with turnout rates at 
first-order elections, a steady decrease was observed in 
the participation in EP elections since 1979.1  
                                                          
1 The EU-wide turnout rates for the EP elections were: 62% in 
1979, 59% in 1984, 58% in 1989, 57% in 1994, 50% in 1999, 
45% in 2004, 43% in 2009 and finally again 43% in 2014.  
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Was turnout in the 2014 election lower than in the 
preceding first-order election? In order to test this ex-
pectation against reality, we compare the respective 
turnout levels. Figure 2 shows the results of this analy-
sis. We find that participation in the 2014 EP elections 
is systematically lower than it was in the preceding 
FOEs of the member states. Exceptions to this rule are 
Belgium and, to a lesser degree, Luxembourg. Belgium 
and Luxembourg are organising general elections un-
der a compulsory voting regime, though in Luxembourg 
this applies only to citizens under 75 years of age. This 
is why participation in these two countries is about as 
high as it was in the previous national elections—there 
is no additional electoral mobilisation necessary there. 
In addition to this, Belgium ran simultaneously first-
order elections and provincial elections together with 
the election of the members of the European Parlia-
ment. Surprisingly enough, the recorded participation 
rate for the Belgian EP election is 90 per cent, while it is 
88.5 for the simultaneous national first-order election. 
Belgium then is the only country with a somewhat 
higher turnout rate in the EP election. Another country 
that does not really meet our expectations is Greece 
(EL=Ellada) where electoral participation was very close 
(only 2.5 per cent lower) to the level of the previous 
election of the members of the national parliament. As 
Greece was (and still is) one of the hardest-hit coun-
tries in the current financial crisis, we might see this as 
an indication that the Euro crisis has contributed to the 
politicisation of EU policies and hence to electoral mo-
bilisation there.  
Furthermore there are huge differences in partici-
pation rates between member countries. The five 
countries with the lowest participation are all Eastern 
European which share a communist background of un-
free elections. The lowest participation rate of all is 
recorded in Slovakia with only 13.05 per cent. This is 
the lowest rate ever recorded in a European Parlia-
ment election. Slovakia is followed by the Czech Re-
public with 18.2 per cent, Poland with 23.83 per cent, 
Slovenia with 24.55 per cent, and Croatia with 25.06 
per cent. The highest participation rates among mem-
ber states, after Belgium and Luxembourg, are record-
ed in Malta, Greece, Italy, Denmark and Ireland. It is 
important to underline that there are three crisis coun-
tries in the list, even if participation rates were lower 
than in national elections. The Eurozone crisis and the 
subsequent politicisation of EU policies seem to have 
stimulated electoral participation (see Appendix for a 
detailed table of participation rates).  
3.2. Did Government Parties Lose? 
Another central prediction of the second-order elec-
tions model is that governing parties lose support 
while opposition parties win. These kinds of elections, 
it is argued, are frequently used to punish the parties 
of the incumbent government. In EP election of 2014, 
this prediction is valid for 20 of the 28 member coun-
tries. In four cases (Austria, Belgium, Finland, and 
Lithuania), governing parties (including parties partic-
ipating in government coalitions) were able to gain a 
modestly higher proportion of the valid vote com-
pared to what they had in the last first-order election;  
 
Figure 2. Participation rates in the European Election of 2014 and the preceding FOE. 
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however the difference in each case is small—less 
than 3 per cent on average. Two other cases are Hunga-
ry and Italy. Hungary ran national elections in April 2014, 
and the European Parliament election was organised 
very shortly thereafter. This seems to be a clear case of 
a post-electoral euphoria. In Italy, the case is similar in 
substance but somewhat different in the proceedings. 
The Italian government changed its Prime Minister in 
February 2014. The positive resonance of the incoming 
new, young, and energetic leader can therefore be 
equally understood as a source of post-electoral eu-
phoria (Segatti, Poletti, & Vezzoni, 2015). Figure 3 
shows vote shares of government parties in the 2014 
European Parliament elections and the preceding first-
order national election. 
The case of Latvia is another exception to the sec-
ond-order rule of government losses in second-order 
elections. Three years after the previous first-order 
election the governing coalition increased its share of 
votes. This again has a simple and straightforward ex-
planation: Latvia went through a Prime Minister (PM) 
change in January 2014. The country’s new PM, Laim-
dota Straujuma was backed by an expanded four-party 
coalition, including the Unity, two Green parties, and 
the National Alliance (The Economist, 2014). 
Turning to the final exception of Slovenia we note 
that the country ran early elections in July 2014—one 
month after the EP election in May—after the resigna-
tion of the previous government in May. So we assume 
that the political verdict about the new government 
was already taken at the moment of the European Par-
liament election and the subsequent national first-
order election was only rubber-stamping the decision 
from late May.  
3.3. Do Government Losses Follow the National 
Electoral Cycle?  
The second-order elections model not only claims that 
governments are expected to lose support in these kinds 
of elections, it also claims that these losses follow the 
first-order electoral cycle. We have already referred to 
this cycle when talking about post-electoral euphoria. 
Earlier research has shown that this regularity is less vis-
ible in the new member countries from Eastern Europe 
(Schmitt, 2005). This was understood as resulting from a 
lesser degree of saturation of the post-communist party 
systems originating from the much weaker ties between 
voters and parties (Schmitt & Scheuer, 2012).  
Figure 4 identifies a modest relationship between 
the differences in governing parties (or coalitions) vote 
shares and the proportion of national electoral cycle 
that was completed at the time when the 2004 EP elec-
tion was held. 
We find the expected curvilinear pattern: on aver-
age, governing parties lose most around midterm, and 
do comparatively better shortly after the last and 
shortly ahead of the next first-order election. There are 
a lot of cases that do not really follow that pattern, and 
the relationship is therefore not very strong. However, 
it is stronger in the West of Europe with its well-
established party systems than it is in the much young-
er and weaker party systems of the new democracies 
in the East (as is shown in the Appendix to this paper). 
 
Figure 3. Vote share of government parties in the 2014 European Election compared to the preceding first-order na-
tional election. 
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Figure 4. The electoral cycle and vote difference of the governing parties. 
3.4. Do Big Parties Lose? 
The last, but certainly not the least important assump-
tion of the second-order elections model is related to 
the prevalent mechanism of vote choice. There are two 
basic mechanisms—sincere and strategic voting 
(Alvarez & Nagler, 2000). The model claims that, since 
there is less-at-stake, citizens have less of an incentive 
to vote strategically. Instead, they are free to cast their 
vote in a sincere manner and support their first elec-
toral preference, rather than another (larger, stronger, 
more likely to govern) party for deliberate reasons. For 
testing the hypothesis, we need to discriminate small 
parties from large parties. There is no consensus how-
ever on the issue of at what proportion of votes small 
parties end and large parties begin. For this reason, we 
compare the effective number of electoral parties 
(ENEP) in a party system both at the EP election and at 
the previous first-order election. Comparing these two 
numbers, we expect the index value for the European 
Parliament elections to be larger—thus indicating a 
larger number of effective parties in second-order elec-
tions. Figure 5 shows the results of this comparison. 
Small parties did better in almost all of the EU 
members, sometimes considerably better. Spain is the 
first country to mention here since the ENEP has in-
creased by 3.42 points. Even if the reasons are complex 
and require further study (Cordero & Montero, 2015), 
we are tempted to speak about a party system change 
and are not surprised that the significance of smaller 
parties continued in the 2015 national first-order elec-
tion. The Netherlands follows Spain, with a 3.06 in-
crease in the effective number of parties compared to 
the 2012 elections. 
We can also see that in Romania and Sweden small 
parties did better. However, there are also some bor-
derline countries, such as Austria, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, and Lithuania in which the ENEP number re-
mained effectively unchanged. Only in Croatia, Italy 
and Latvia there is a certain decline in ENEP from the 
national elections to the 2014 European Parliament 
election, these are the countries that do not support 
the prediction. Overall, however, the large majority of 
countries support the theoretical expectation.  
3.5. Do EU Policies Affect the Vote in EP Elections? 
We turn to testing our two final hypotheses. They state 
that parties on the right gain in EP elections when im-
migration is high (H5), and that Eurosceptical parties 
gain in EP elections when the country belongs to the 
Eurozone (H6). The dependent variable here is the per-
centage point gain (or loss) of a party in the European 
Parliament election of 2014 compared to its result in 
the last national election. We test these expectations 
in such a way that their additional contribution (in ad-
dition to the indicators specified by the SOEs model) to 
our understanding of the EP election results is identi-
fied (Table 1). 
Before we turn to testing these hypotheses, we 
first have a look at the performance of our well-known 
SOE indicators in this party-level analysis. What we find 
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Figure 5. Effective number of parties: EP2014 and the preceding first-order national election. 
Table 1. Explaining parties’ gains and losses from the preceding first-order election to the European Election of 2014: A 
multivariate perspective. 
 
Model 1: Empty model Model 2: Basic model Model 3: Full model 
Fixed effects    
Intercept -0.134 (0.556) 2.471 (3.098) 5.121*** (1.391) 
Electoral cycle 
 
-0.010 (0.041) -0.022 (0.039) 
Party in government  
 
-5.291** (2.135) -4.807** (2.092) 
Party size 
 
-0.315*** (0.043) -0.301*** (0.042) 
Party left-right position 
 
0.394 (0.276) 0.378 (0.316) 
Party EU support 
 
0.033 (0.500) -1.971** (0.899) 
Share of migrants in country  
 
0.037 (0.074) 0.038 (0.070) 
Eurozone member  
 
0.008 (0.979) 0.194 (0.913) 
Cycle * government  
 
0.166** (0.072) 0.154** (0.072) 
Left-right pos’n * migration 
  
-0.007 (0.054) 
EU support * Eurozone 
  
2.878** (1.046) 
Random effects (variance)    
Intercept 0 2.042 0.846 
Left-right position  0.666 1.879 
EU support  1.117 1.218 
Residuals 49.1 30.250 27.786 
N party/country 159/28 159/28 159/28 
Log Likelihood -535 -500 -593 
AIC 1075 1032 1027 
Note: * denotes p<0.1; ** denote p<0.05; *** denote p<0.005. All country-level variables (i.e. share of migrants) are grand 
mean centred. All level 1 variables with random slopes (i.e. left-right position and EU support) are group mean centred. 
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is quite comforting: the factors of the SOEs model work 
well at the party-level and confirm our insights from 
the country-level analysis. We see that small parties 
win—the larger the party, the higher the losses in EP 
elections; this is in fact our strongest effect. We also 
find that national government parties lose in European 
elections; this effect is statistically significant but con-
siderably weaker compared to the size effect. And last 
but not least, we find that government parties’ losses 
are moderated by the position of the EP election in the 
national electoral cycle—they do relatively better, the 
further away the EP election is to national midterm; 
this is again a somewhat more modest but statistically 
significant effect. Model 2 includes, in addition, a num-
ber of main effect variables (like share of immigrants 
and left-right position of party) for merely statistical 
reasons—we are only interested in their interaction 
with one another and will not consider them in any 
greater detail here. 
3.6. Do Parties on the Right Win in EP Elections When 
the Share of Immigrants in a Country Is High?  
We do not find any trace of such a mechanism. The in-
teraction between the left–right position of a political 
party and the proportion of immigrants is not only in-
significant but its miniscule effect is also pointing in the 
wrong direction. It could of course be that this interac-
tion is superseded by the party size variable and mani-
fest itself if the latter would be omitted as a control 
variable. However, party size is a much more general 
factor at work on the left and the right.  
So we conclude that the free movement of people 
as one of the core freedoms of the Single European 
Market does not benefit the parties on the right in par-
ticular. But why then have UKIP and FN had such a 
spectacular result in the 2014 EP election? Part of an 
answer could be that different electoral systems are 
used in national and EP elections in both countries—
and that majoritarian systems as applied in national 
first-order elections in both Britain and France benefit 
large, centrist parties. Another part could be the weak-
ness of the national government in both countries at 
the time of the election. However, both arguments do 
not point to the domain of EU policy making. 
3.7. Do Eurosceptic Parties Win If They Compete Within 
a Eurozone Country?  
This is our second EU policy based hypothesis—
Eurosceptical parties are expected to win in EP elec-
tions as a result of the frictions around the public debt 
crisis in large parts of the South of the Union. A first 
quick look at the respective coefficient in Model 3 of 
Table 1 seems to support the expectation. However, 
plotting the relative electoral gains and losses of politi-
cal parties for both Eurozone members and non-
members tells us something else (Figure 6). 
What we see here is that within the Eurozone, Eu-
rosceptical parties are doing somewhat worse in EP 
elections than they have done in the previous national 
first-order election. This effect is very weak and statis-
tically not significant. Outside the Eurozone, however, 
we find a quite strong opposite effect: Eurosceptical 
parties do considerably better in EP elections than they 
have done in the previous national first-order election. 
In 2014, the turmoil within the Eurozone benefitted Eu-
rosceptic parties of countries that were not part of it. 
 
Figure 6. Predicted gain-loss of political parties by their EU support within and outside the Eurozone. 
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4. Conclusion 
This article aims to understand the main dynamics in 
the 2014 elections of the members of the European 
Parliament. Two rival expectations are investigated—
the second-order national elections model and the EU 
policy scenario.  
According to the first, European citizens decide 
about their representatives in Brussels mainly accord-
ing to national criteria. From Reif and Schmitt (1980) 
onwards, various authors have assessed the “second-
orderness” of EP elections, mostly confirming the origi-
nal predictions. This paper asks the same question for 
the May 2014 elections, which were held after six years 
of economic crisis and various political changes in Eu-
rope.  
According to the second scenario, citizens are im-
pressed by the consequences of the growing scope of 
EU policy making (we concentrate here on intra EU mi-
gration and the Eurozone crisis) and support Euroscep-
tical parties as a consequence in European Parliament 
elections. In this second view, it is the policies of the 
European Union—more specifically the Single Europe-
an Market and the European Monetary Union—that of-
fers the main stimulus for electoral behaviour, not the 
national political process. 
After testing the second-order elections assump-
tions, we conclude that in general they still hold. The 
first prediction we have tested is that participation is 
lower in EP elections compared to the preceding FOEs in 
the member-countries. We found it is still valid. The only 
country where some doubts arose is Greece where elec-
toral participation in the EP election was very close to 
the participation rate in the preceding FOE. 
Another important assumption of the model is that 
government parties (or members of government coali-
tions) lose support. This prediction holds up as well, 
but there are a number of deviant cases. Some of them 
can be explained as post-election euphoria, while oth-
ers require further investigation. When we look for the 
relationship between these losses and the national 
electoral cycle we conclude that governing parties lose 
the most at around midterm and do comparatively bet-
ter shortly after and ahead of subsequent elections. 
The national electoral cycle is still a stronger moderator 
of government parties’ losses in the consolidated party 
systems of Western Europe as compared to the post-
communist party systems of Eastern Europe. The fourth 
assumption was that small parties do better in the EP 
elections. This was also corroborated. In most of the 
Member States the “effective numbers of electoral par-
ties” (ENEP) is higher in EP elections than it is in national 
first-order elections. Among the larger consolidated 
electoral systems under study, the special case of Spain 
needs to be mentioned here. In Spain, the effective 
number of parties rose to 3.42 index points, which might 
well point towards a severe party system change. 
So the “second-orderness” of European Parliament 
elections, in its main aspects, has again been con-
firmed. Does this also mean that the EU policy scenario 
failed to inform our understanding of the 2014 EP elec-
tion results? This is what we find in our exemplary 
analysis. Parties on the right do not gain more support 
under conditions of high immigration; and Eurosceptic 
parties do not systematically gain more support within 
the Eurozone versus outside of it—on the contrary, the 
opposite seems to be the case.  
All in all, we can say that the assumptions of the 
second-order elections model are still valid. The 2014 
European Parliament elections were second-order 
elections, and the politicisation of European Union pol-
itics did not really discourage the predictions of the 
second-order model. The “indirect” election of the 
President of the European Commission in the course of 
the 2014 European Parliament election—which has 
been referred to as the Spitzenkandidaten plot 
(Schmimmelpfennig, 2014)—did not change the insti-
tutional context in such a way that these elections 
would have lost their second-order character. Howev-
er, future research will have to have an eye on these 
developments.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Turnout rates in FOEs and EP Elections. Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu 
Country Turnout FOE (Year) Turnout EP2009 Turnout FOE (Year) Turnout EP2014 
AT 78.8 (2008) 45.97 74.9 (2013) 45.39 
BE 91.1 (2007) 90.39 88.5 (2014) 89.64 
BG 60.2 (2009) 38.99 51.3 (2013) 35.84 
HR 59.5 (2007) 20.84 56.3 (2011) 25.06 
CY 89 (2006) 59.4 78.7 (2011) 43.97 
CZ 64.5 (2007) 28.22 59.5 (2013) 18.2 
DK 86.5 (2006) 59.54 87.7 (2011) 56.3 
EE 61 (2007) 43.9 62.9 (2011) 36.52 
FI 67.9 (2007) 38.6 70.4 (2011) 41 
FR 60.2 (2007) 40.63 57.2 (2012) 42.43 
DE 70.8 (2009) 43.27 71.5 (2013) 48.1 
EL 70.92 (2009) 52.61 62.5 (2012-II) 59.97 
HU 67.8 (2006) 36.31 61.7 (2014) 28.97 
IE 67 (2007) 58.64 70 (2011) 52.44 
IT 80.5 (2008) 65.05 75.2 (2013) 57.22 
LV 61 (2006) 53.7 59.5 (2011) 30.24 
LT 48.6 (2008) 20.98 52.9 (2012) 47.35 
LU 85.2 (2009) 90.76 91.4 (2013) 85.55 
MT 93.3 (2008) 78.79 93 (2013) 74.8 
NL 80.4 (2006) 36.75 74.3 (2012) 37.32 
PL 53.8 (2007) 24.53 48.9 (2011) 23.83 
PT 59.7 (2007) 36.77 58.1 (2011) 33.67 
RO 39.2 (2008) 27.67 41.8 (2012) 32.44 
SK 54.7 (2006) 19.64 59.1 (2012) 13.05 
SI 63.1 (2008) 28.37 64.7 (2011) 24.55 
ES 73.9 (2008) 44.87 71.7 (2011) 43.81 
SE 82 (2006) 45.53 84.6 (2010) 51.07 
UK 61.3 (2006) 34.7 65.1 (2010) 35.4 
Note: There have been six national elections in 2014. Hungary had one in April 2014 and Belgium had simultaneous 
first-order and EP elections. However, Bulgaria (Oct.), Latvia (Oct.), Slovenia (July) and Sweden (Sept.) had them after 
May 2014 elections. For this reason, they are not included in this table. 
 
Figure A1. The electoral cycle and vote difference of the governing parties, for Western Europe. 
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Figure A2. The electoral cycle and vote difference of the governing parties, for Eastern Europe. 
